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In his book and article Cognitive Pragmatics, Bruno Bara presents a "unified" 
theoretical account of the mental processes involved in communication (Bara 
2010,2011). Through its inclusion of different strands of research, this account 
is broader than that advanced by any of its predecessors (e.g. Sperber and 
Wilson's relevance theory 1995 [1986]). In this way, the centrality of behavior 
games—a notion that echoes Wittgenstein's concept of a language game— 
brings a much-needed social dimension to a cognitive explanation of commu-
nicative processes. The emphasis on the validation of key claims through the 
study of how pragmatic skills develop in children and become disrupted through 
disease and injury places the somewhat neglected areas of developmental 
pragmatics and clinical pragmatics, respectively, at the center of theoretical 
work in pragmatics. The use of modern brain imaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) 
to establish the neural correlates of communicative processes introduces the 
nascent discipline of neuropragmatics into pragmatic theorizing. As this list 
demonstrates (and it is not an exhaustive list by any means), there is plenty to 
engage the reader in Bara's cognitive pragmatics. The issues I want to address 
are the role of theorizing in pragmatics and whether a "theory" of the mental 
processes involved in communication is even intelligible. To this extent, while 
applying to Bara's proposals, my comments are also relevant to theory con-
struction more widely in pragmatics. 
It has long been recognized that the expression and recognition of intentions 
must be at the center of any theory that seeks to explain communication 
between speakers and hearers. The central role of intentions in communication 
can be easily demonstrated. The speaker who utters "I'm leaving early tomor-
row" may be motivated to do so by a number of different communicative inten-
tions. On one occasion, the speaker's intention in producing this utterance may 
simply be to inform his hearer of his travel plans. On another occasion, the 
speaker may produce this utterance with a view to issuing a threat to his hearer. 
On still other occasions, the speaker who produces this utterance may be 
undertaking a promise to his hearer. The identification of the particular 
communicative intentions that find this same utterance being used to provide 
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information on some occasions, and to issue threats and make promises on 
other occasions, involves a set of cognitive skills in humans that is without 
parallel in other animal species. These skills have been variously characterized 
as having a theory of mind (ToM) or as engaging in mind reading. They are the 
focus of Bara's attempts to explain the mental processes of communication. I 
have argued elsewhere that although a sizeable literature now exists on ToM 
skills in both normally developing children and children and adults from a 
range of clinical populations, this literature has so far had relatively little to say 
about these skills in the specific context of utterance interpretation (Cummings 
2009, 2012a, 2013, 2014). It is surely sensible to ask what type of T o M skills 
are employed by the hearer, who is trying to establish a speaker's communica-
tive intention in producing an utterance. At least this is the type of sensible 
question that the pragmatist will want to ask. Indeed, it is the question to which 
Bara's cognitive account is chiefly directed. 
Although Bara does not use the expression "theory of mind" when charac-
terizing the mental processes involved in utterance interpretation, it is clear 
that it is T o M skills that he has in mind in his cognitive pragmatics. At the 
outset of his article, Bara (2011: 443-444) remarks: 
M y intention is to describe the mental states of the participants in a communicative in-
teraction. In addition to an analytical description, I will also furnish a formal definition 
of the various mental states, such as belief &nA intention, offering a number of innova-
tions compared to traditional treatments, thereby offering solutions to problems that 
have hitherto not found satisfactory explanations. The mental states introduced will 
then come to constitute a logical model that accounts for both the production and the 
comprehension of communication acts in the ongoing process of their construction, 
(italics added) 
In his book, Bara (2010: 252) explicitly acknowledges the role of T o M skills in 
the comprehension of irony and deceit, two nonstandard speech acts in his 
account: 
If a child has not mastered the theory of mind, he can in no way understand nonstandard 
speech acts such as irony and deceit. Indeed, this theory is crucial for the very existence 
of human communication, since this is an intentional activity aiming at modifying men-
tal states in others, (italics added) 
The difficulty for pragmatists who seek to explain the mental processes in-
volved in communication is not that communicative intentions and other men-
tal states are involved in utterance interpretation—this much is incontestable. 
Rather, it is that once communicative intentions and other mental states are 
admitted to a theory of communication, we must relinquish any prospect of 
giving an intelligible account of these states. It is not simply that the number 
of mental states involved in utterance interpretation is large (it is very large 
indeed), or that the content of these states reflects a broad range of interests, 
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purposes and values that it would be impossible to circumscribe (an account of 
mental state content would be an account of life itself). It is that we cannot 
make sense of the type of boundary that a theory of these mental states would 
entail, let alone the intentions, beliefs, and knowledge that would fall within 
such a boundary. Different theorists have attempted to draw this boundary in 
different places. For the relevance theorists Sperber and Wilson, the boundary 
takes the form of a deductive device, which processes assumptions according 
to the logical entries of their constituent concepts. For Habermas, the boundary 
takes the form of his theory of communicative competence, a theory that was 
conceived in order to counter positivism's restrictive influence on the notion of 
rationality. It was argued in Cummings (2005a) that these communication 
"theories" render themselves unintelligible by an impulse to theorizing that 
makes it seem that we can develop a theory of communicative rationality in 
much the same way that we can develop theories in the physical or biological 
sciences (see chapters 4 and 7 in Cummings 2005a for detailed discussion). But 
whereas theories about physical forces or the actions of enzymes presuppose 
rational concepts, specifically the rational concepts that make their intelligible 
expression possible, the situation is quite different for a theory of communica-
tive rationality. Such a theory cannot presuppose rational concepts when it is 
these concepts that are properly the focus of theorizing. Yet in the absence of 
these concepts, we lack the type of rational framework that is needed to make 
sense of and even describe the theory of communicative rationality that we 
take ourselves to be characterizing. 
So, theorizing about the conditions and processes that make human com-
munication possible is something quite different from theory generation in a 
number of other areas. The unintelligibility that attends the former type of 
theorizing is not an issue in the latter type of theorizing. The question now is 
whether Bara's attempt to produce a theory of the mental processes that are 
involved in communication evades the type of criticism outlined above, a 
criticism that has been influenced by the philosophical work of Hilary Putnam 
(Cummings 2005a, 2012b). According to Bara, certain speech acts are more 
complex than other speech acts (a fact attested to by the results of developmen-
tal and clinical studies), because they require a greater number of inferential 
steps on the part of the hearer in order to link them to the behavioral games of 
which they are moves. Inferential complexity is thus a key criterion in Bara's 
categorization of speech acts such as irony and deceit: 
I will speak of simple irony when the interlocutor can grasp speaker meaning instantly, 
moving directly from the utterance to the behavior game of which the utterance may be 
considered a move . . . I define complex irony as irony in which the interlocutor must carry 
out a series of inferences in order to grasp speaker meaning . . . the difficulty of an act 
of deception depends on the number of inferences B requires to reach the hidden game, 
starting from A's untruthful communication act. (Bara 2011: 469-470; italics in original) 
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Clearly, behavior games, "hidden" and otherwise, play a significant role in 
Bara's account. It is appropriate to interrogate the exact nature of that role for 
what insights it can bring to our current predicament. That predicament, stated 
briefly, is that theories of communication are unintelligible on account of their 
attempt to institute boundaries on the conditions and processes that make com-
munication possible. The first thing to notice is that by casting the complexity 
of speech acts in terms of the number of inferences that are required to link 
them to a behavior game, Bara is using a social construct to ground his account 
of cognitive pragmatic processes (behavior games, Bara (2011: 453) remarks, 
are the "social framework of communication"). This shift from cognitive 
processes to the social domain may address a number of problems, such as the 
avoidance of an infinite regress in the communicative intentions that are 
involved in utterance interpretation.1 However, the issue that I am specifically 
concerned to address is whether it avoids the unintelligibility that afflicts other 
communication "theories," an unintelligibility that arises when we think we 
can theorize about the conditions (here, mental states) that make communica-
tion possible in much the same way as we can theorize about phenomena in the 
physical and natural world. Bara's reliance on the notion of behavior games, 
particularly if this notion is made to assume more than just the appearance of a 
Wittgensteinian concept, suggests that avoidance may be possible. To demon-
strate this point, it is necessary to engage with Hilary Putnam's philosophical 
views and with a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein, which has had a 
profound influence upon them. 
Putnam's philosophical ideas have assumed a position of considerable 
prominence in analytical philosophy over many years. His work in areas such 
as language, mind and science is too vast to do justice to it in this context (see 
Cummings 2002, 2005b) for discussion of some of Putnam's thinking in these 
areas). However, one argument in particular weaves its way throughout his 
philosophy and is relevant to our present concerns. This is Putnam's challenge 
to metaphysical realism. As described by Putnam (1988: 107), metaphysical 
realism is "a bundle of intimately associated philosophical ideas about truth." 
The metaphysical realist aims to explain the success of science in terms of the 
reference of the theories of science to subsets of the totality of all objects. The 
metaphysical realist's reductionism, particularly his predilection for physical 
description, leads him to pursue an explanation of reference in terms of a 
causal relation. The key feature of this relation, as characterized by the causal 
theorist, is that it is devoid of the very intentional notions that it may be taken 
to stand in explanation of. However, it is Putnam's claim that no intelligible 
explanation of this reference relation can proceed in the non-intentional man-
ner typical of causal theories of reference. Prior to Putnam's Dewey Lectures, 
he had appeared content to express his rejection of causal theories in terms of 
what he believed to be their reductionist nature. With the presentation of his 
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Dewey Lectures, Putnam attempted to articulate further his dissatisfaction 
with the metaphysical realist's position. The focus of his attention at this time 
shifted from the scientific reductionism, which motivates metaphysical realism, 
and causal theories of reference, to the question of why it seems that a reduc-
tionist approach is the only serious contender when our inquiries turn to prob-
lems in the philosophy of mind. 
It is Putnam's claim that what motivates the case of reductionism is an 
interface conception of mind. Indeed, once one has accepted an interface 
conception of mind, then one must either proceed by reducing intentionality 
(reductionism) or explaining intentionality away (eliminativism). This inter-
face conception of our mental functioning has been, and continues to be, enor-
mously influential. Notwithstanding the appeal of this picture, Putnam argues, 
the interface conception of mind is inherently unintelligible. Its unintelligibility 
stems from a certain metaphysical standpoint, one that assumes that we can 
adopt a God's Eye point of view (to quote Putnam) from which we can com-
pare thought and language with reality "in itself." From this standpoint, it 
seems that we can survey all human concepts without in turn presupposing 
those concepts. The difficulty with this standpoint is that it leaves us with no 
means of making sense of the notion of a causal relation or of a reality "in 
itself." For in both cases, there is no residual notion of rationality with which 
to understand these notions. Moreover, it is not a solution to say that we cannot 
compare thought and language with reality "in itself." For in employing the 
notion of a reality "in itself," this negative thesis falls foul of the same unintel-
ligibility from which it is intended to be an escape. For Putnam, a way through 
this impasse is to be found in Wittgenstein. As James Conant remarks in the 
introduction to Putnam's Words and Life: 
The readings of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations that Putnam 
himself (now) urges are ones which take Wittgenstein to be concerned to show that the 
limit against which, in our philosophizing, we (imagine ourselves to) chafe is an illu-
sory limit. On this reading of Wittgenstein . . . "we cannot know the world as it is 'in 
itself . . . not because the ' in itself is an unreachable limit, but because the 'in itself 
doesn't make sense". (Putnam 1995: xl) 
Under the pressure of doing philosophy, Putnam is arguing, we proceed by 
examining concepts apart from their applications in the different domains of 
our lives. When we do eventually set about examining their applications, we 
can only see these concepts through a lens of metaphysically imposed stan-
dards. As James Conant has remarked, "[tjhis is one way into metaphysics" 
(Putnam 1995: liii). Under the influence of this metaphysical impulse, we 
inevitably go forward by erecting standards about what must be the case in 
order for our thoughts to represent (refer to) reality. The typical manifestation 
of these standards is in the form of a philosophical theory, thus explaining 
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Putnam's concern that, "what he is offering should not be taken for a philo-
sophical theory in the traditional sense" (Putnam 1995: xi; italics in original). 
To overcome the domination that this metaphysical impulse has over us and, in 
so doing, find a way back out of metaphysics, we must begin by looking and 
seeing just how concepts are applied within our various practices. This requires 
that we engage in a process of description, the aim of which is an accurate 
characterization of the consequences that a particular picture, and the concepts 
inherent in it, has for its user. In his Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psychology & Religious Belief, Wittgenstein describes the considerations that 
are subsumed within this type of description: 
"God's eye sees everything"—I want to say of this that it uses a picture. 
I don't want to belittle him [the person who says it.] . . . 
We associate a particular use with a picture . . . 
What conclusions are you going to draw? . . . Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in 
connection with the Eye of God? . . . 
If I say he used a picture, I don't want to say anything he himself wouldn't say. I want 
to say that he draws these conclusions. 
Isn't it as important as anything else, what picture he does use? . . . 
The whole weight may be in the picture . . . When I say he's using a picture I'm merely 
making a grammatical remark: [What I say] can only be verified by the consequences 
he does or does not draw . . . 
A l l I wished to characterize was the conventions he wished to draw. If I wished to say 
anything more I was merely being philosophically arrogant' (1966: 71-72; italics in 
original). 
The most outstanding feature of this descriptive process is the restrictions 
placed on the extent of the description. Wittgenstein doesn't want to say any-
thing he (the user of the picture) himself wouldn't say; indeed, to say more is 
"being philosophically arrogant." For Putnam at least, Wittgenstein shows us 
the way through the unintelligibility that attends philosophical theories such 
as metaphysical realism. The question now is if Bara's characterization of 
behavior games is sufficiently Wittgensteinian in nature to allow his cognitive 
pragmatic theory of communication to evade a similar charge of unintelligibility. 
To recap, theories of physical and natural phenomena are distinct from theo-
ries of the communication processes that are used to describe and characterize 
those phenomena. The former theories presuppose rational concepts of the 
type that are needed to produce intelligible statements. However, the latter 
(communication) theories cannot presuppose these concepts when it is con-
cepts such as meaning, reference, and sense that are the focus of theorizing. By 
virtue of their attempt to step outside of these concepts in the drive to present 
a complete analysis of them, the proponents of communication theories render 
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their own statements unintelligible in nature. In this respect, a communication 
theory is no different from a philosophical theory like metaphysical realism— 
both are attempting to transcend the very concepts that confer sense on the 
statements contained in those theories. But in the same way that, as Putnam 
claims, we can talk intelligibly about mental representation and reference, 
even i f not from a metaphysical standpoint, I believe it is also possible to talk 
intelligibly about the mental processes of communication. That way lies in an 
approach to philosophy practiced by Wittgenstein, an approach which Bara's 
cognitive pragmatics must now demonstrate it can replicate. 
Note 
1. Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) describe an "infinite regress" of communicative intentions 
that is involved in the interpretation of utterances. However, Bach (1999: 359) remarks that, 
"[a] communicative intention is . . . a self-referential, or reflexive, intention. It does not 
involve a series of nested intentions—the speaker does not have an intention to convey some-
thing and a further intention that the first be recognized, for then this further intention would 
require a still further intention that it be recognized, and so on ad infinitum." 
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